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X.

XIII.

A GREAT LEAP FORWARD FOR TAX FAIRNESS?

I.

• .

INTRODUCTION

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has been widely heralded as the most
important tax legislation since the income tax was converted to a tax
on the masses during the Second World War. Since his favorite proposal for a constitutional amendment - the one calling for a balanced
budget - was not adopted, the 1986 Tax Reform Act clearly will be

*Justice S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale. B.B.A., 1966, Emory University; LL.B., 1969,
University of Virginia. This article was delivered as the Dunwody Lecture at the University
of Florida College of Law, on March 11, 1988. Certain portions of this article appeared as
commentary by the author in TAX TIMES.
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the major domestic achievement of Ronald Reagan's presidency. This
law even produced the new Internal Revenue Code of 1986; no more
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. It took until the very
end of 1987 until we were forced to add that felicitous phrase "as
amended" to the 1986 Code.
The near term future of the income tax - and, perhaps, even its
long-term destiny - will be shaped by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
It is, to be sure, significant legislation, some would even say unique,
massive both in its scope and in its detail - at least a 9.1 if we had
a Richter scale for this sort of thing. What seems most unique to me
about this legislation, however, is the character of the commentary it
has inspired, commentary marked by hyperbole. Hyperbole about the
1986 Act from the politicians and the press is, of course, unexceptional;
hyperbole, after all, is their stock in trade. I am surprised, however,
that nobody even asked President Reagan, "Are you sure?" when he
described the 1986 Tax Act as ''the best anti-poverty measure, the
best pro-family measure and the best job-creation measure ever to
come out of the Congress of the United States." Wrong. Wrong.
Wrong. Zero for three, Mr. President.
Even people who should know better have gotten carried away.
Reading the academic literature on the 1986 Act has a quality reminiscent of watching a Tennessee Williams' play: you know there is something very wrong here, but nobody's talking about it. The Brookings
Institution, for example, published an article heralding the 1986 Tax
Reform Act as "The Impossible Dream Comes True. "1 Surely that title
says more about the poor author's dreams than about the 1986 Tax
Act. The 1986 Act has generated a flood of commentary and, necessarily, an enormous amount of technical analysis, but it has inspired very
little real evaluation of its merits and demerits. The time has come
to tell the truth about this tax reform.

II.

THE SORRY STATE OF PRIOR LAW

First, that this legislation is such a major event is surely more a
testament to the sorry state of prior law than to the wondrous and
delightful quality of the new statute. The federal income tax was
increasingly criticized in the 1980s as inequitable, economically inefficient, and unnecessarily complex. In 1972, a plurality of Americans
had considered the federal income tax the fairest of all the major taxes

1.

Aaron, The Impossible Dream Comes True: The New Ta.x Reform Act,

REV. 3 (1987).

5 BROOKINGS
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used by the various levels of government; from 1979 to 1983, a plurality
rated the income tax as the least fair. 2
This sentiment was attributed in part to the widespread perception
that "everybody else" was engaging in tax avoidance or outright tax
evasion. For example, 69 percent of respondents in a 1978 survey
agreed that ''most people who have a higher income than I do manage
to get away with paying less than their fair share of taxes." Inflation
also contributed to the unpopularity of the income tax by producing
''bracket creep" that taxed individuals at higher marginal rates each
year regardless of whether they had experienced any increase in their
purchasing power.
Moreover, capital was running around the country like the Keystone Cops, looking for the most tax-favored investments. Much of
the nation's innovative energies, entrepreneurial spirit, and marketing
imagination had become concentrated in the creation, production, and
selling of "tax shelter" investments. High income individuals thought
they had finally discovered the golden-egg goose. Unfortunately it
was the taxpaying middle class that was being plucked. There was
hardly an airline pilot or dentist in the country who believed it was
better just to earn a dollar, pay fifty cents in taxes and keep fifty
cents, than to throw the dollar at a tax shelter in the hopes of keeping
it all. P.T. Barnum would have loved it. The game was so silly that
tax shelters had emerged in a wide variety of products hardly crucial
to the national economy, such as jojoba beans. Even I got calls from
tax shelter promoters. My favorite call was from someone selling a
tax shelter in chinchilla farms. An investment not only allowed the
investor to be included among the nation's ever increasing group of
financially troubled small family farmers, but also promised a chinchilla
coat. If they had only had one in my size, I might have ''invested."
Who could ask for anything more?

III.

THE POLITICAL MIRACLE

I now believe that the silence of critics concerning the 1986 Act
is due to a combination of shock that this legislation actually got
enacted and a quiet recognition that it was the product of a very
uneasy marriage of two contrary ideological and political camps.
The growing antipathy toward the income tax had not gone unnoticed by the nation's politicians. Many ''tax reform" bills were introduced in Congress in the early 1980s, most notably the "Fair Tax" of

2. Goode, Overview of the U.S. Tax System, in THE PROMISE OF TAX REFORM 14-15
(Pechman ed. 1985).
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Democratic Senator Bill Bradley and Representative Richard
Gephardt, and the "Fair and Simple Tax" (FAST) of Republican Representative Jack Kemp and Senator Robert Kasten. Also, President
Reagan asked the Treasury in his 1984 State of the Union message
to prepare a "plan for action to simplify the entire tax code so all
taxpayers, big and small, are treated more fairly."
A number of proposals - principally by academics, but also by
some members of Congress - would have replaced the income tax
with consumption taxes, but by late 1984, the leading proposals of
both Republicans and Democrats would apply a reduced and "flattened" rate structure to a broadened income tax base that would include many preference items that have previously gone untaxed. A
three volume document of analysis and income tax reform proposals
was released by the Treasury Department in November 1984. 3
The Treasury proposal was similar in many respects to the two
leading congressional proposals for a broader-based, flatter-rate income tax. The Treasury proposal departed from the Bradley-Gephardt
and Kemp-Kasten proposals, however, both by including more items
of income in the tax base and by eliminating more deductions, and
also by attempting to redress such basic structural problems of the
income tax as the distortions of income measurement due to inflation
and the "double" taxation of corporate profits distributed to shareholders as dividends. In addition, although the Treasury Plan was revenueneutral overall, it did contain a corporate tax increase that was used
to finance tax reductions for individuals. Like the Bradley-Gephardt
and Kemp-Kasten plans, the Treasury proposal relied not only on the
elimination of many ·existing tax preferences to discourage tax shelters,
but also proposed lower rates both as a fundamental trade-off for base
broadening and to make such tax shelter deductions less attractive to
potential investors. On May 29, 1985, President Reagan submitted his
tax reform proposals to Congress. Although these recommendations
differed in some important respects from all three predecessor plans,
they embraced the general principles of a broader-based flatter-rate
income tax that ultimately were enacted in the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
Notwithstanding bipartisan support for the idea of income tax reform, probably the most remarkable thing about this legislation is that
it happened. 4 According to conventional wisdom, major tax reform
3. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR
FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1984).
4. For an excellent description of how the 1986 Tax Reform Act made it through Congress,
see J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS,
AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1st ed. 1987). See also Minarik, How Tax
Refcmn Came About, 37 TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 1359 (Dec. 12, 1987).
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legislation cannot be enacted unless three forces coalesce: Presidential
initiative, enthusiasm from the tax writing committees' chairmen, and
strong and vocal support from the populace. So much for conventional
wisdom. How on earth was this tax reform enacted?
First, Ronald Reagan and his Republican colleagues became surprising leaders of a tax reform movement. The Democratic party in
its political platforms had long supported base-broadening income tax
reform, but many Democrats doubted the wisdom of that position.
The Bradley-Gephardt plan, for example, was not embraced by Walter
Mondale in his 1984 presidential campaign, and the tax reform rhetoric
produced very little by the way of legislation. Jimmy Carter in 1978
had pronounced the income tax "a disgrace to the human race" and
called for its "complete overhaul." Instead of an overhaul, however,
all he got was the usual oil change and lubrication. The Republicans,
on the other hand, had never been known as great advocates of
broadening the income tax base.
Ronald Reagan had described the progressive income tax as having
come "direct from Karl Marx" who, according to Reagan, "designed
it as the prime essential of a socialist state. "5 Yet President Reagan
made tax revision his highest domestic priority, attempted with many
trips and speeches to foment public support, and, by going personally
to Congress at a critical moment, rescued the bill from destruction
by the House Republicans.
President Reagan's key congressional ally ultimately proved to be
Senator Robert Packwood, then the Republican Chair of the Senate
Finance Committee, who had so often praised the prior tax code and
urged new loopholes that the New Republic magazine had dubbed him
"Senator Hackwood." He seemed to share a very limited ambition with
Dan Rostenkowski, the Democrat Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee - a man notorious for having little substantive interest
in the tax law. But neither wanted to be known as the person who
killed tax reform.
Congressional ennui mirrored public disinterest. Unlike 1969, for
example, when Congress received more letters on tax reform than on
any other issue (including the Vietnam war), the 1986 tax reform faced
public silence. Although it remained something of an apple pie issue
- everyone supports tax simplification and reform in the abstract no groundswell of support for the President's proposal emerged. On
June 25, 1986, the day after the Senate had passed the Tax Reform
5. Reagan, Encroaching Control: Keep Government Poor and Remain Free, 27 VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 677 (1961), quoted in Chirelstein, Back from the Dead: President
Reagan Saved the Income Ta.x, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 207 (1986).
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Bill by a 97-3 vote, The New York Times reported results of a telephone poll: less than one-third of the American public believed that
the Senate bill would either produce a fairer tax system or reduce
their taxes. Political momentum was bipartisan, but tepid.
IV.

THE

CRITICAL

IDEA

Typically one of two dominant concerns supplies the motivation for
tax reform: fairness (either in the overall level or distribution of the
tax burden) or short-term fiscal policy needs. This time, neither provided the impetus. Congress did hear public concern about high-income
individuals who had found shelter from tax and about corporations
that had managed to combine high book profits with little or no tax
liability, but the prospect of improving fairness in the distribution of
the overall tax burden was inadequate to the task of tax reform. Other
than the goal of removing people at the poverty level from the income
tax rolls, distributional fairness issues generated little enthusiasm;
"distributional neutrality'' became the guiding principle.
Likewise, notwithstanding some efforts to sell tax reform on the
ground that it would reduce taxes for a majority of Americans by
increasing taxes of corporations or someone else, no one regarded the
current endeavor as an occasion for an overall tax reduction. The
great tax reducing momentum of the 1970s that inspired California's
Proposition 13 and similar changes dramatically reducing state taxes
and that had served as the fulcrum for the federal tax legislation of
1981, was absent. Moreover, tax reform this time was isolated from
the most critical issue for short-term economic well-being: deficit reduction. Hopes for simplification offered some stimulus, but deregulation of the economy is the idea that seems to have provided the
greatest push for this tax reform effort.
By 1986, reducing the size of government and deregulating the
national economy had become an article of faith within the Reagan
administration and within the Republican party generally. The intellectual motivation for deregulating the economy, restricting the government's role in influencing economic decisionmaking in the private sector, argues strongly for broadening the tax base and lowering tax
rates. Incremental tax revisions like those of previous years simply
are incapable of performing any substantial deregulation function. Only
a major base-broadening change could advance deregulation ambitions.
Although the goal of greater neutrality in affecting economic decisions
has long been claimed for tax revision legislation, this tax reform
seems genuinely to have been designed in substantial part to serve
deregulation, an unconventional tax policy idea.
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AN UNEASY MARRIAGE

Ultimately then, what moved the 1986 tax revision was an uneasy
marriage of two very different agendas. The conventional tax reformers - who principally were interested in improving tax equity by
broadening the income tax base so that income would be treated in
similar fashion for tax purposes regardless of its source - joined
together with supply-siders and deregulators who principally were
interested in enacting lower tax rates ''to get government off the
backs" of the American public and American businesses. Without a
substantial reduction in the tax preference and incentive provisions
of the tax code, deregulation of the American economy would necessarily have remained incomplete, and a massive reduction of tax rates
had long been the supply-siders' dream.
That this marriage could occur in Congress was due in large part
to the divergent effects of the 1986 ta."'< reform on the business community. Some businesses, such as service and high technology businesses,
enjoy a substantial tax reduction principally due to the lowering of
the top corporate rate from 46 to 34 percent; others face a significant
ta..x increase, either because of repeal of special industry-specific tax
breaks or, more generally because of the repeal of the investment tax
credit. As a result, the business community was split politically, with
some major corporations fighting the tax reform every step of the
way, but with others playing a strong supporting role.
This is a very uneasy marriage. The ink was hardly dry on the
1986 Act before divorce proceedings started. Some Democrats, most
notably the Speaker of the House James Wright, started talking immediately about delaying rate reductions scheduled to go into effect
in 1988 to reduce the federal deficit. But that did not happen, and
the majority of Democrats do not seem so politically stupid to push
for an income tax rate increase immediately. The only Democrat who
"stood up" for tax increases, Bruce Babbitt, was promptly given his
exit pass from the Presidential race. Likewise, the supply-siders are
already expressing concerns about the effect of the Tax Reform Act
on savings and investment, and are readying new tax incentive ideas
and preparing to resurrect old ones. Only the large size of the federal
deficit seems likely, at least temporarily, to keep both of these forces
at bay.
VI.

THE Tw!N TOWERS: REVENUE NEUTRALITY
AND DISTRIBUTIONAL NEUTRALITY

Prior to 1982, conventional wisdom held that tax reform could be
enacted only in connection with an overall tax reduction. The basic

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
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premise was that elimination of special tax privileges had to be bought
through a reduction in the level of taxes. The Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 turned this conventional wisdom on its
head. That year Congress enacted a series of "loophole-closing'' provisions to increase federal revenues and narrow future deficits. The
1982 experience led many people to believe that tax reform proposals
could succeed only if they contributed significantly to federal revenues
thereby lowering deficits.
By contrast, the linchpin of the 1986 Act was revenue neutrality.
By insisting on revenue neutrality, both the Administration and the
Congressional leadership were able to demand that amendments to
the tax bill should be offered only if any revenue losses were offset
by revenue gains. This remarkable procedural use of the revenue
neutrality requirement served with great effect both in the House and
Senate tax writing committees and on the Senate floor. As one Senator
remarked during the Finance Committee's markup, an important constituent felt quite differently about an amendment that would have
restored a 100 percent deduction for business entertainment expenses
when that change was explicitly coupled with an increase of one point
in the corporate tax rate. By the same token, Senators themselves
behaved quite differently in this novel environment; to pay Peter,
they had to be explicit and exact in stating how they intended to rob
Paul.
For the would-be-seer, the crucial role of revenue neutrality in
shaping this legislation should cause consternation. It is now possible
to believe that substantial tax reform can be accomplished only in the
context of revenue neutrality or, alternatively, to believe that significant tax revision is now possible whether revenues are reduced, increased, or left unchanged.
Tax reform started out not only revenue neutral, but also distributionally neutral; that is, the view predominated that this tax reform
should not become an occasion for significant shifts in the distribution
of income tax burdens among income classes. By the time the 1986
tax reform finally made its way through Congress, the pure distributional neutrality of the original Bradley-Gephardt bill had been abandoned. 6 Corporate taxes were raised somewhat from their low levels
of the early 1980s to finance individual income tax reductions for
middle and lower income people, but the 1986 Act never became an
occasion for any important shift in the distribution of the income tax
burden across income classes. The singular distributional achievement

6.

See Minarik, supra note 4, at 1365-66.
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of this legislation is the widely-heralded removal of six million poverty
level families from the income tax rolls. But as one wag has already
pointed out, these are the same six million people who Congress originally removed from the tax rolls in 1969 and again from time to time
throughout the 1970s and who kept finding themselves subject to
income tax because of the effect of inflation in increasing their level
of taxable income. Distributional neutrality, along with revenue neutrality comprised the guiding principles for this legislation.
VII. THE

OVERALL

EFFECTS OF THE 1986 ACT

A tax act forged from a concerted effort to be neutral both in
terms of the total federal revenue and the distribution of the tax
burden simply will not have massive economic effects on the American
economy, no matter what the politicians, the journalists, or some
economists would have you believe. This tax bill will therefore likely
neither revitalize American productivity, as some of its admirers
suggest, nor destroy it, as many of its detractors contend. Recent
economic estimates suggest that the 1986 Act will spur perhaps a one
percent increase in hours worked, a genuine benefit, but no new American revolution.
The 1986 legislation increases taxes on the income from new business investment because the repeal of the investment tax credit,
depreciation revisions, and other corporate tax increases were not
fully offset by lower corporate tax rates. Both the 15ase-broadening
and the lower rates should tend to inspire investment decisions guided
more by economic than tax considerations. By lowering significantly
the wide disparities· of prior law in the tax burdens of corporations in
different industries, improvements should occur in the allocation of
resources and this should have some positive long-term effect on the
American economy. There should be some increase in the efficiency
of the use of capital. Debates will, no doubt, rage for years about how
successful are the 1986 Act's efforts to reduce tax distortions of investment decisions and thereby improve the efficiency of the American
economy. In any event, the immediate effects of this tax reform on
the overall state of the American economy should be small - dwarfed
in fact by general fiscal and monetary policies. For example,-reduction
of overall interest rates of 0.8 percentage points would fully offset the
increase in the cost of capital caused by the 1986 Act's revisions of
the corporate tax.
Thus, cries of fear for the American economy because of the 1986
increase in corporate taxes seem greatly overstated. The 1986 Act's
increase in corporate taxes simply halted what was becoming one of
the world's great disappearing acts; the corporate tax had declined
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from more than 28 percent of federal revenues in 1953 to about 6½
percent in 1983. Even after the 1986 changes, the corporate income
tax is expected to account for only about 11 percent of federal revenues
and the share of total income taxes paid by corporations will continue
to be below pre-1980 levels.
Even the dramatic reduction in the maximum individual tax rate
by the 1986 Act, to 28 percent, does not seem likely to have major
ecowmic significance. The last time income tax rates were this low
was the period 1925-1932 when Secretary of the Treasury Andrew
Mellon set the model for Ronald Reagan by lowering the top rate
from its high of 73 percent in 1921 (when he took office) to 25 percent
in 1925. President Reagan started three points lower, at 70 percent
in 1981, and ended three points higher, at 28 percent in 1986, so there
may still be something left for George Bush to do. Of course, the
period of the 25 percent top rate from 1925 to 1932 was something of
a mixed economic bag: times were very good for a while, then times
became very bad. During the subsequent five decades from 1932 to
1982, also a period of some very good years and some bad ones, the
top rate never dropped below 63 percent. The notion that low
maximum tax rates are good - indeed, critical to the American economy - is an article of faith in some quarters, principally Republican
ones, and that faith is unshakable. Historical facts are merely accidents
to true believers.
VIII.

THE DEMISE OF FEDERAL TAX PROGRESSIVITY

The reduction in the top rate, notwithstanding its likely minimal
impact on the American economy, nevertheless is the most significant
aspect of the 1986 Act. First, it signals, at least for now, the demise
of progressivity as the guiding principle for fairness in the distribution
of tax burdens in the federal tax system. This elimination of progressivity as a potent normative ideal, no doubt, largely accounts for
President Reagan's joy upon signing the 1986 Act. In combination
with the continuing escalation of payroll tax revenues and the 1981
emasculation of the estate and gift taxes, 7 the 1986 Act's rate changes
essentially eliminated progressivity from the federal tax system.
Reagan had long regarded progressivity as morally wrong and had
stated that it conflicted with the proportionality of the Biblical tithe,
10 percent from rich and poor alike. Reagan also, as I have indicated,

7. See generally Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259
(1983); see also Graetz & McDowell, Tax Reform 1985: The Quest for a Fairer, More Efficient
and Simpler Income Tax, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 5, 16-23 (1984).
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had asserted that the idea "crone directly from Karl Marx," ignoring
such earlier radical proponents of tax progressivity as Adam Smith.
The demise of progressivity was aided and abetted in Congress by
the widespread notion that no one paid taxes at the top rates because
of the proliferation of tax shelters during the 1970s and early 1980s.
Boris Bittker has shown this notion to be wrong in his calculations
that about 15 percent of the revenues generated by the income tax
came from income taxed at either a 49 or 50 percent rate in 1982. 8
Even more importantly, the impact of the destruction of progressivity in the rate structure as the proper normative principle for income
tax fairness has been masked by the cloak of the "distributional neutrality" principle. In terms of actual short-term distributional consequences, the distributional neutrality criterion meant little change in
the post-1986 Act progressivity of the burden of the income tax, although the removal of six million poverty-level people from the income
tax roll did increase progressivity at the bottom and Congress did
attempt somewhat to target tax reductions to the middle class. How
everyone else fared depends on the distribution of the burdens of the
corporate tax changes. If the corporate income tax is a burden on
capital - as many economists believe, at least in the short run the higher income classes did not achieve a great tax reduction. On
the other hand, if the corporate tax burden is passed on to consumers
in the form of higher prices - as most business people believe both the middle class and progressivity took something of a beating.
More importantly, however, by looking to 1985 law as the normative
guide rather than to some other normative benchmark grounded in
notions about fairness in the distribution of taxes, the distributional
neutrality principle had the effect both of blessing the substantial
reduction in progressivity that had been achieved in the 1981 federal
tax legislation and, in effect, of ratifying the tax reductions that highincome dentists and others had managed to achieve through tax shelter
investments.
The genuinely interesting question, of course, is whether this most
recent demise of progressive income tax rates will prove more stable
than that wrought by Andrew Mellon in the 1920s (even though seven
years with a top rate of 28 percent may be long enough for the rich
to get considerably richer). As before, it may take some massive
economic shock or even a war to produce significantly higher income
tax rates, although the deficit seems to mean that top rates will not

8.

Bittker, Letter to the Editor, in NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, July 16, 1987, at49-50.
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get lower than they are today. This is a very good year for earning
income. My guess is that the resurrection of progressive income tax
rates will occur slowly, if at all.
IX.

THE TENUOUS CAPITAL GAIN LINCHPIN

Ironically, the greatest threat to the low top rates fashioned by
the 1986 Act currently comes from proposals to reduce capital gains
taxes. No issue better reflects the tension in the 1986 marriage of the
traditional tax reformers and the supply-siders than their attitudes
toward taxation of capital gains. Beginning with the 1969 Tax Reform
Act, which eliminated the top 25 percent rate that had previously
been applicable to capital gains, and continuing through the 1976 Tax
Reform Act, proponents of tax reform had succeeded in narrowing
the gap between tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income. Under
the 1976 Act, the potential top rate on capital gains was 49.9 percent,
compared to a 50 percent maximum rate on earned income (and a 70
percent rate on unearned income). In 1978, the Treasury Department,
under President Carter, had developed major tax reform proposals
that resembled closely the 1984 Treasury recommendations. The thrust
of those proposals was a major cutback on itemized deductions, a top
income tax rate of 50 percent, and equal taxation of capital gains and
ordinary income.
By 1978, however, Congress was less concerned about ensuring
that high-income individuals paid their fair share of tax and more
concerned about redressing overtaxation due to inflation and increasing
investment and "capital formation." (It was the supply-siders' opening
day.) The tax burden on capital gains was unacceptably high in light
of these concerns, and the Revenue Act of 1978 lowered the top capital
gains rate to the now magic number of 28 percent. This was done,
first, by increasing the exclusion of capital gains from income from 50
to 60 percent of long-term gains, and second, by changes in the
minimum tax provisions. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
lowered the maximum rate on all ordinary income from 70 percent to
50 percent. As a result, the highest marginal rate on capital gains
became 20 percent, a top 50 percent rate applied to the included 40
percent of capital gains. (This was the supply-siders' heyday.)
The 1986 Act eliminated the preferential tax treatment of capital
gains, which means that like ordinary income, capital gains beginning
in 1988 are taxed at a top average rate of 28 percent, although the
top marginal rate may be as high as 33 percent. As a signal of the
likely stability of this abolition of the capital gain advantage, Congress
retained the entire pre-1986 statutory structure for distinguishing capital gains and losses from ordinary gains and losses.
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The elimination of the capital gains preference was a key aspect
of the 1986 Act. It meant that the distributional consequences of
lowering the top rate to 28 percent were not unacceptable to the
traditional tax reformers. It restrained the 1986 tax reductions for
the highest bracket taxpayers and, at the same time, the increase in
the top capital gains rate from 20 to 28 percent was estimated to
produce some revenue to finance the overall rate reduction.
Several bills were introduced in Congress in 1987 to lower the
capital gains rate. President Reagan expressed his desire for lower
capital gains rates in his legislative message to Congress accompanying the 1988 State of the Union Address. George Bush has crisscrossed America urging a reduction in the rate on capital gains to 15
percent.
The huge federal deficit now serves as the barrier generally precluding tax reduction proposals from being taken seriously in Congress,
but capital gains has a certain magical quality that may allow it to
elude this force. Congress may predict a revenue gain any time it
changes capital gain taxation, whether by lowering or increasing rates.
It all depends on what Congress assumes that the rate change will
do to people's realizations of capital gains. Both in 1978 when capital
gain taxes were reduced, and again in 1986 when they were increased,
Congress predicted increased federal revenues. Absent any revenue
constraint, only concerns about the fairness of further tax reductions
for high income taxpayers obstruct reintroduction of the capital gains
preference into the income tax.
Of course, once the capital gain tax rate is lowered, the magic
disappears from the 28 percent top rate. It is the taxation of capital
gains at the same rate as ordinary income that effectively caps the
top rate at 28 percent. Eliminate the linkage between capital gains
and ordinary income and you eliminate the main glue that keeps the
top rate on ordinary income from going higher. The uneasy political
marriage would turn into an angry divorce. It would be ironic indeed if
the supply-side proponents of lower taxes on capital gains were to
succeed in lowering that rate and, in so doing, pave the political path
to higher and more progressive tax rates on ordinary income.

X. A

GREAT LEAP FORWARD FOR TAX FAIRNESS?

Admirers of this tax reform consider its greatest achievement to
be in redressing and reversing the inequities of prior law. Both the
base-broadening provisions and the lower tax rates have been widely
heralded as ushering in a new era of income tax fairness. I would
agree that the real merits of this legislation must be located in its
improvements in tax equity, particularly in its promotion of greater
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''horizontal equity'' among taxpayers - the idea that people with
similar incomes should pay similar amounts of tax. Once again, however, the achievements of the 1986 Act seem to have been exaggerated.
Probably the most significant accomplishment of the 1986 Act in
improving tax equity is one that has been little remarked upon; the
restructuring of the taxation of family investment income. Structural
changes in the taxation of families were made possible in 1986, as
they had been nearly 40 years earlier in 1948 when the joint return
provisions for married couples were ushered in, by the lowering and
flattening of the rate structure.
For example, the deduction of prior law for married couples applicable when both spouses work was repealed by the 1986 Act, but
this was defended as a consequence of the flattening of the rate
schedule rather than as a statement of social policy. According to the
Report of the Senate Finance Committee, "[a]djustments made in the
relationships of the standard deductions and rate schedules for unmarried individuals and married couples filing joint returns compensate
for the repeal of this provision. "9 The economist, Harvey Rosen, investigating the truth of this assertion for married couples in different
income classes with different ratios of spousal earnings, however, has
concluded that although both the percentage of families paying a positive marriage tax and its size will be lower than under the old law,
some families will still be paying substantial penalties for being married. In 1988, he estimated that about 40 percent of U.S. families will
pay an average marriage tax of $1100, a total of about $24 billion. At
the same time, he determined that about 53 percent of the families
will receive a marriage subsidy averaging $609 per family, a total of
$17.4 billion. 10 Again, benefits of the 1986 legislation have been overstated. The 1986 Act is a long way from neutral with respect to the
treatment of married and unmarried people with differing divisions of
income. It does appear, however, that single parents with children
did quite well by this legislation, particularly at lower and middle
income levels.
On a more positive note, the 1986 Act did narrow dramatically
opportunities of prior law for lowering taxes within families on investment income, a change that was long overdue. The flattening of the
rate schedule and reduction of the top rate had an important impact
in significantly decreasing the tax savings possible from shifting income
among family members. More importantly, however, the Tax Reform

9. Report of The Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1986).
10. Rosen, The Marriage Tax is Down, But Not Out, 40 NATL TAX J. 567 (1988).
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Act restricts intrafamily income shifting opportunities by eliminating
major tax advantages previously available to trusts and by aggregating
the unearned income of young children with the income of their parents
in determining the applicable tax rate. The 1987 legislation redressed
a similar tax advantage by eliminating graduated tax rates for professional corporations. Structural changes of this sort tend to acquire a
certain permanence despite subsequent movements in the rate structure.
The other and more widely heralded tax equity measures of the
1986 Act seem more suspect. The 1986 Act - principally through the
new ''passive loss" rules, which restrict the ability of taxpayers to use
losses from tax shelter investments to reduce taxes on earned income
or ''portfolio" income (such as interest and dividends) and a
strengthened minimum tax - has been said to have eliminated tax
shelters. Such an assertion is overstated at best. Tax shelters have
been wounded, to be sure, but seem far from dead. Even in New
Haven, Connecticut, low income housing is being placed in historic
rehabilitation projects to obtain two tax credits instead of one. People
are giving historic easements to charity and thereby combining charitable deductions with tax credits. Interest and dividends, now
"portfolio" income, are being converted into rents because ''passive"
income can be offset with tax shelter losses, and so on. I can hardly
wait to learn what is happening in Beverly Hills, the tax shelter capital
of the world. The American personality seems to have become an
addictive one; some are unable to give up drugs, others cannot say
"no" to a tax shelter. Only a costly tax audit, combined with unsuccessful litigation and the payment of huge sums of back taxes, interest,
and penalties seem to be an effective cure.
Congress, too, still has a monkey on its back. If anyone actually
thought that the 1986 legislation meant that Congress had forsaken
using the income tax as a blunt instrument of other public policies,
the 1987 denial of foreign tax credits for South African taxes surely
proves otherwise. The 1986 Act does not mark the end of tax incentive
provisions. It may simply be a low point. To be sure, the tax incentive
provisions have become more complex. The low-income housing tax
credit (a new concept in the 1986 Act), for example, combines the
worst aspects of a tax incentive with many of the worst features of
direct subsidies. One must apply to state housing agencies to obtain
allocations of low income housing tax credits that the passive loss
rules may well preclude one from using. This cannot be a stable situation.
Legislation has already been introduced that would exempt the
low-income housing tax credit from the passive loss rules. Other candidates for special favorable treatment will soon emerge. The income
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tax will continue to be what it has always been - a source for contests
among different groups with different interests for the privilege of
paying less taxes.
Ultimately, the 1986 Act fails in what has been claimed to be its
shining achievement - the restoration of horizontal equity to the
income tax. One can search long and hard for a unifying horizontal
equity theme in the 1986 legislation and, although there are hopeful
glimmers here and there, what has been produced instead is a series
of complex, unwieldy, and often inequitable political compromises.
To be sure, the ability to use tax shelters was restricted; they are
no longer available as readily as before. Capital gains and ordinary
income are, for the moment at least, taxed at identical tax rates.
Opportunities for income shifting were restricted. But how close does
the 1986 Act bring us to genuine income tax neutrality? There are
many new inequities that will result from this legislation. For example:
(1) The creation of the passive loss concept, as well as
such things as the many new limits on interest deductions,
move the income tax much closer to a schedular tax system
where one's tax liability turns on the kinds of income a
taxpayer has rather than simply on the amount of the taxpayer's net income.
(2) The 1986 Act's minimum tax rules introduce as many
as three separate income tax bases, subject to three separate
rate schedules; these provisions surely will result in different
taxes for people with identical economic income.
(3) Many devices for tax-free investment income remain;
municipal bonds and life insurance products are but two
prominent examples.
(4) No attempt was made in the 1986 Act to address the
many horizontal inequities in the income tax that result from
fringe benefit exemptions; instead, nondiscrimination among
employees by employers was relied upon as a guarantee of
a modicum of vertical equity.
(5) Under the 1986 Act, many families are given a tax
reduction when their children reach age 14; this new distinction in the taxation of families no doubt is to offset the
additional costs from having adolescents in the house.
(6) Deductions for expenses of producing investment income are subject to a variety of arbitrary disallowances
under the 1986 Act, most notably a new floor on these deductions equal to 2 percent of adjusted gross income. These
provisions inevitably will produce many unwarranted and
inequitable variations in tax burdens. To take but one example, employees with reimbursed business expenses will do
better than identically situated employees without such reimbursements.
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(7) The longstanding income tax disparity between homeowners and renters was increased by the new interest deductibility rules of the 1986 Act (and modifications in the 1987
Act) that, for example, now allow homeowners, but not renters, to deduct interest on their purchases of consumer goods.
(8) Many company-by-company or individual ''transition
rules" give benefits to one company or individual while denying them to other taxpayers in identical circumstances.

The basic point of this litany is that, despite claims to the contrary,
the 1986 Act does not reflect a coherent or consistent reintroduction
of horizontal equity into the tax code. As with an extremely popular
children's toy, illusion seems to be the ultimate weapon. The 1986 Act
seems, at least in large measure, to have substituted a norm of ''perceptions of equity'' for the horizontal equity norm. If, in some general
way, the populace can be convinced to believe the income tax is fair,
that now seems to suffice. The kinds of unjustifiable tax differences
of the sorts I have just enumerated are not regarded as serious drawbacks.
Taxpayer perceptions of tax UJ,lfairness may well be of independent
concern, particularly in a tax system such as ours that is based on
self-assessments of tax. Low or middle income taxpayers seem quite
justified when they simply cannot understand why the corporations
and its officers or the individual employers for whom they work pay
less tax on a higher level of economic income than the workers pay
on their salary. Such taxpayer perceptions of inequity ofte:ri result
from genuine unfairness in the income tax, but alleviating the perceptions of inequity can not become an excuse for not redressing the
underlying problems. There can be no substitute for attacking and
preventing horizontal inequities. The 1986 Act does not deserve unbridled plaudits on this score.
XI.

SIMPLIFICATION

There should be little argument that the 1986 tax reform fails as
a simplification measure. Nearly ten years ago the Simplification Committee of the American Bar Association's Tax Section reported that
the path to major income tax simplification lies in applying lower rates
to a broader income tax base. Congress lowered rates and broadened
the base, but somehow lost the way to simplification.
To be sure, tax life will be simpler for the six million people removed from the income tax rolls, but, even for many of them, an
expanded refundable earned income tax credit provision will introduce
new complexities. Likewise, the increase in the standard deduction
should allow many more lower and middle income taxpayers to put
aside the problems of computing and record keeping associated with
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itemized deductions. But for people who believe they may itemize
deductions, and for those middle and higher income families who surely
will itemize, the new complexities are of staggering proportions.
Shortly after enactment of the 1986 Act, the IRS issued a new
W-4 form, the form that wage-earners must complete to inform employers about how much income tax to withhold from their wages.
This form was extraordinarily complex and was soon revised, but the
debacle over its issuance made it unmistakable that the problems of
new complexity are not narrowly confined to large corporations or
high-income individuals. The difficulties were so great that the IRS
took the unprecedented action of announcing that it would forgive
penalties on underwithholding due to the confusion. When Congress
talks about simplification, taxpayers may well be reminded of Emerson's comments regarding an acquaintance, "[t]he louder he talked of
his honor, the faster we counted our spoons."
Compromise is the root of complexity, and the 1986 Act contains
an unending series of political compromises. Congress quite often refused either to eliminate or ratify provisions of dubious merit. Instead,
it reduced their benefits or imposed new limitations on their use. Both
to compromise and to limit complexity requires a willingness by Congress to enact law that is transparently arbitrary - arbitrary, but
relatively simple.
Congress, for example, recognized the folly of actually inquiring
about the personal consumption component of business entertainment
expenses and instead adopted an arbitrary limit of 80 percent for these
deductions. Complaints about the complexity of these limitations are
exaggerated. Even if American technology has fallen behind the
Japanese, American businesses - even small businesses - can still
multiply by 0.8. On the other hand, the interest deduction for individuals, the passive loss limitations, and the individual and corporate alternative minimum tax provisions have become the Brobdingnagians of
complexity induced by compromise. For some taxpayers a four-page
tax. form is now required to calculate the deduction for home mortgage
interest.
Indeed, the 1986 Act's approach to the interest deduction takes
the "foolish complexity'' prize. Since money is fungible, it is the height
of foolishness to attempt to trace borrowed funds to particular uses.
Futility, however, is no bar to legislation; the 1986 Act distinguishes
at least 17 different categories of interest. Home mortgage interest,
for example, was a political untouchable, while credit card interest
was not, but that is hardly adequate reason to enact tax rules of awesome complexity that may serve principally to inspire large portions
of the American public to reconsolidate their consumer, educational,

DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW

1988]

635

and other debts into home equity loans. Hard times now may put not
only people's credit ratings, but also their homes, at risk.
I shall resist the temptation to fill an entire paper with a litany
of 1986 Act complexities. Now that the time has come for filing 1987
tax returns, citizens are being forced to confront prodigious complexities in complying with a wide variety of restrictions on deductions
that had saved them taxes in the past. The 1987 tax rates will seem
higher than had been advertised because they are considerably higher
than the 1988 rates. If the new family of W-4's produces widespread
underwithholding or if the economy quickly turns sour, no one may
be able to prevent the April 15, 1988 deadline from signalling the
requiem for the 1986 Act. On the other hand, if the economy remains
strong and underwithholding is not significant, the rate reductions of
1988 may be viewed as adequate compensation for any new complexities.
XII.

THE 1986 ACT AS A SOLUTION TO THE TAX COMPLIANCE
PROBLEM AND OTHER IMPOSSIBLE DREAMS

Tax experts have long maintained that their favorite policy recommendations would induce greater tax compliance. Shortly after enactment, IRS Commissioner Lawrence Gibbs offered his version of the
impossible dream: the 1986 Tax Reform Act will solve the tax compliance crisis.
Lower tax rates, everyone's favorite solution to tax compliance,
have widely been urged as a compliance stimulant, although there is
no good theoretical or empirical evidence for this claim. Experience
offers little comfort. The committee reports on the 1969 Tax Reform
Act, for example, claimed that lowering the top marginal tax rate on
earned income to 50 percent would induce entertainers, professionals,
and other high earners to concentrate on their jobs instead of on tax
avoidance. The then-new ''low" 50 percent top rate was to be the dike
holding back the tax shelter industry; Congress apparently believed
that at this rate tax shelters would not be worthwhile. Some dike!
Even the recent top capital gains rate of 20 percent has not been
sufficiently low to induce compliance. The IRS estimates that capital
gains have accounted for a significant proportion - about 11 percent
- of unreported income from legal sources. 11 Although, like most IRS
noncompliance estimates, this number should not be taken literally,

11.

Graetz & Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fa.ct and Fantasy, 38 NAT'L TAX

J. 355 (1985).
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it is weighty enough to suggest that when people believe they have
an opportunity to under-report income with little prospect of detection
and penalties, they will - even if the unreported income would only
have been subject to a low tax rate. The lowering of the top tax rates
by the 1986 Act is no guarantee of greater compliance. In the context
of tax compliance, we should substitute for the famous Laffer curve
the "compliance checkmark." Full compliance should be expected only
at a zero percent tax rate.
There are other sources of optimism about the improvements in
tax compliance that some people expect to result from the 1986 Act.
The optimists assert that if only we had a tax system that the people
regard as fair, they would comply. Yes, broadening the tax base, for
example by eliminating tax shelters, may free a number of IRS personnel for other tasks in striking at noncompliance. One should be
slow to believe, however, that people who have heretofore rationalized
noncompliance on the ground that the system is unfair will now prefer
complying fully to finding - and perhaps even believing in - an
alternative reason for not complying.
Simplification, too, has been thought of as a solution to the noncompliance problem, but the newly reformed income tax is hardly
simple for upper income individuals and corporations. To be sure, the
1986 Act's elimination of many low income people from the tax rolls
should reduce the proportion of nonfilers, but it is a bit much to count
this an as improvement in tax compliance.
Other important categories of noncompliers seem even less likely
to be chastened by the 1986 legislation. Take tax protesters, who
routinely resort to the flimsiest of legal arguments as grounds for not
complying - arguments such as the invalid ratification of the sixteenth
amendment or that only payments backed by gold are taxable; they
are far more likely to regard judicial penalties, not the 1986 legislation,
as a reason for abandoning their protests.
People who have been successfully under-reporting their income
in the legal sector of the economy will consider an increase in their
marginal tax rate from zero even to 15 percent or 28 percent a burden
worth avoiding, and it would be a great surprise if the 1986 legislation
induced them to volunteer the correct information. Plumbers do not
seem likely to stop offering discounts for cash payments.
As for redressing noncompliance on the part of earners of illegal
income, we will have to rely, I fear, on the Big New War on Drugs,
not the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Perhaps technology will develop a
way to detect tax understatements, as well as cocaine, in the urine.
We, of course, anxiously await evidence about the cumulative effects on tax compliance of the increases in penalties and information
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reporting adopted throughout the 1980s, including the bit in this legislation, but opportunities for additional direct assaults on noncompliance
are limited. Additional withholding is out - the experience with interest and dividend withholding proved that. Additional information
reporting from individuals offers little hope. The IRS already expects
more than one billion information reports annually; there· is not much
readily usable information left to be reported by individuals. Penalty
limits for taxpayer misconduct seem to have been reached; notwithstanding the reinvigorated public taste for the death penalty,
capital punishment is simply not feasible for tax evasion. Indeed, the
future seems likely to involve penalty reductions. Birthday filing,
sometimes proposed to stagger the IRS workload, would only serve
to ruin birthdays, and might soon be followed by birthday audits. I
can just imagine the birthday telegrams the IRS might send. A significant increase in tax audits seems now to offer the best potential for
improving tax compliance and closing the ''tax gap."
If the compliance problem endures, more radical remedies should
be considered. The Senate version of the 1986 Act showed promise
by attempting to convert the IRS into a government "profit center."
But it did not go far enough. An ancient idea involving principles
currently in vogue could be revisited: revenue farming. In Greece and
Rome, and especially in France (before the revolution), the tax collection process was privatized, farmed out. In modern America, for example, the government might begin by taking bids from accounting or
law firms for the amount of revenue they might collect from Fortune
500 companies, and then selling the concessions to the highest bidder.
Tax farming should increase compliance while reducing the size of
government. At the same time, it would eliminate tax practitioners'
worries that new governmental standards of professional conduct are
driving a wedge between them and their clients. With the proper
adjustment in the federal budgeting process, revenue farming might
also be viewed as a solution to the farm crisis.

XIII.

CONCLUSION

I believe that the shortcomings of the 1986 Tax Reform Act detailed
here have major implications for the future directions of federal tax
legislation. First, the complexity of the 1986 Act, coupled with its
failure to adopt and maintain a coherent vision of horizontal equity,
render it unstable. Even if it would, Congress cannot resort to principle as a basis for resisting change. Only the compelling need for
federal revenues to combat the budget is now serving to bar renewed
legislative tinkering.
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Second, even a minor economic downturn will produce calls for
restoration of investment tax credits and more rapid depreciation allowances. The political fragmentation of the business community,
which enabled the 1986 Act to go forward, will not be present in such
a circumstance. If the size of the federal deficit should properly bear
responsibility for such an economic setback, the failure of the massive
1986 Act to even begin to address the dominant economic issue of its
time will contribute to its own downfall. The very revenue neutrality
that enabled the Act to go forward may well also have planted the
seeds of its undoing.
For the longer term, the 1986 Act may be most important because
it reflects a political decision by both Republicans and Democrats to
retain and strengthen the income tax rather than to heed calls of
economists and conservative (and even some "neoliberal") politicians
to replace it with a consumption tax. How much the income tax has
actually been strengthened remains to be seen. I, for one, obviously
remain somewhat skeptical. In addition to the concerns I have already
expressed, the failure of the income tax to address systematically the
problem of inflation in the measurement of taxable income - perhaps
the dominant income tax problem of the 1970s12 -is a serious omission.
Advantages in accounting for inflation often formed the intellectual
grounding of those who argued in the late 1970s for replacing the
income tax with a progressive-rate consumption tax or a value-added
or retail sales tax. 13 Congress's choice not to address the fundamental
problems of the income tax base caused by inflation may have been
reasonable at the low rates of inflation that existed in 1985 and 1986,
but seems quite likely to haunt both taxpayers and Congress in the
future.
Ultimately, the stubbornness of the federal deficit may drive Congress and the next President to a national tax on consumption either
in the form of a retail sales tax or a value-added tax. The alternative
of additional income tax base-broadening, perhaps including increased
minimum or regular taxes on income of corporations, does not seem
to have great appeal. Selective excise taxes, including an oil import
fee or gasoline taxes, are temporary measures. Regardless of which
party captures the White House this year, a national sales tax will
look far better politically than significant increases in income tax rates.

12. See, e.g., Graetz & McDowell, supra note 7, at 16-23.
13. See, e.g., INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION (Report of a Committee chaired by Professor J.E. Meade, Britain, 1978).
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A national sales or value-added tax then would prove to be the
fiscal legacy of Reaganomics. Federal tax progressivity would then
surely be moribund, if not dead. The nation's tax system would then
more closely conform to the original intent of the Founding Fathers.
The Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bork will not have been
this Administration's only shot at original intent. Alexander Hamilton,
to take but one of the founders, had only praise for consumption taxes.
He claimed that only with such taxes could people choose how much
taxes to pay. As he put it, ''the rich may be extravagant, the poor
may be frugal." This indeed would be a fitting tax legacy from Mr.
Reagan, our second President from California, but our first from
Hollywood.

